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Abstract. Decentralization is a key indicator for the evaluation of pub-
lic blockchains. In the past, there have been very few studies on mea-
suring and comparing the actual level of decentralization between Proof-
of-Work (PoW) blockchains and blockchains with other consensus pro-
tocols. This paper presents a new comparison study of the level of de-
centralization in Bitcoin and Steem, a prominent Delegated-Proof-of-
Stake (DPoS) blockchain. Our study particularly focuses on analysing
the power that decides the creators of blocks in the blockchain. In Bit-
coin, miners with higher computational power generate more blocks. In
contrast, blocks in Steem are equally generated by witnesses while wit-
nesses are periodically elected by stakeholders with different voting power
weighted by invested stake. We analyze the process of stake-weighted
election of witnesses in DPoS and measure the actual stake invested by
each stakeholder in Steem. We then compute the Shannon entropy of the
distribution of computational power among miners in Bitcoin and the dis-
tribution of invested stake among stakeholders in Steem. Our analyses
reveal that neither Bitcoin nor Steem is dominantly better than the other
with respect to decentralization. Compared with Steem, Bitcoin tends to
be more decentralized among top miners but less decentralized in gen-
eral. Our study is designed to provide insights into the current state of
the degree of decentralization in DPoS and PoW blockchains. We believe
that the methodologies and findings in this paper can facilitate future
studies of decentralization in other blockchain systems employing differ-
ent consensus protocols.
1 Introduction
The evolution of Blockchain made Bitcoin the first cryptocurrency that re-
solves the double-spending problem without the need for a centralized trusted
party [15]. From then on, rapid advances in blockchain technologies have driven
the rise of hundreds of new public blockchains [12]. For most of these public
blockchains, the degree of decentralization of resources that decide who generates
blocks is the key metric for evaluating the blockchain decentralization [6,12,18].
This in turn facilitates further understanding of both security and scalability
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in a blockchain [11]. Intuitively, having only a few parties dominantly possess
the resources indicates a more centralized control of blockchain, which is poten-
tially less secure. This is due to the fact collusion among these few parties can be
powerful enough to perform denial-of-service attacks against targeted blockchain
users and even falsify historical data recorded in blockchain. More concretely,
in a Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchain such as Bitcoin [15], a miner possessing
higher computational power has a better chance of generating the next block.
In Bitcoin, a transaction is considered to be ‘confirmed’ after six blocks as it
is estimated that the probability of creating a longer fork after six blocks to
defeat the one containing the ‘confirmed’ transaction is negligible. However, the
assumption is not held when a few miners possess over half of overall computa-
tional power in the network, in which case these miners are able to launch the
commonly known 51% attack to control the blockchain and double-spend any
amount of cryptocurrency. Through selfish mining [5], the difficulty of perform-
ing 51% attack could be further reduced to the demand of possessing 33% of
overall computational power, indicating even weaker security in less decentral-
ized blockchains.
Recent research pointed out that Bitcoin shows a trend towards central-
ization [1,6,12,17,18]. For the purpose of reducing the variance of income, the
majority of Bitcoin miners have joined large mining pools and a small set of min-
ing pools are now actually controlling the Bitcoin blockchain. Meanwhile, the
use of PoW consensus protocol in Bitcoin requires the decentralized consensus
to be made throughout the entire network and the throughput of transactions
in Bitcoin is limited by the network scale. As a result, the 7 transactions/sec
throughput in Bitcoin cannot satisfy the need of many practical applications [3].
Motivated by these concerns, recently, the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) con-
sensus protocol [13] is becoming increasingly popular and has given rise to a series
of successful blockchains [12,14]. The key selling point of DPoS blockchains is
their high scalability. In DPoS blockchains, blocks are generated by a small set
of witnesses that are periodically elected by the entire stakeholder community.
Thus, the decentralized consensus is only reached among the witnesses and the
small scale of the witness set could boost the transaction throughput to support
various types of real applications such as a social media platform [14]. However,
there are disagreements over the level of decentralization in DPoS blockchains.
The supporters believe that, in practice, the design of equally generating blocks
among witnesses in DPoS blockchains is less centralized than the current PoW
blockchains dominated by few mining pools. Others believe that, in theory, the
very limited scale of the witness set naturally shows a low degree of decentral-
ization. Existing research works have evaluated the degree of decentralization in
Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains represented by Bitcoin and Ethereum [6,18].
However, there have been very few comparison studies on measuring the actual
level of decentralization between PoW blockchains and DPoS blockchains.
This paper presents a comparison study of the level of decentralization in
Bitcoin and in Steem [14], a prominent DPoS blockchain. Our study particu-
larly focuses on analysing the power that decides the creators of blocks in the
blockchain. We analyze the process of stake-weighted election of witnesses in
DPoS and measures the actual stake invested by each stakeholder in Steem. Sim-
ilar to the analyses in recent works [12,18], we quantify and compare the actual
degree of decentralization in these two blockchains by computing the Shannon
entropy of the distribution of computational power among miners in Bitcoin and
that of the distribution of invested stake among stakeholders in Steem. Our re-
sults shows that the entropy in Steem among top stakeholders is lower than the
entropy in Bitcoin among top miners while the entropy in Steem becomes higher
than the entropy in Bitcoin when more stakeholders and miners are taken into
computation.
Our analyses reveal that neither Bitcoin nor Steem is dominantly better than
the other with respect to decentralization. Compared with Steem, Bitcoin tends
to be more decentralized among top miners but less decentralized in general.
Our study is designed to provide insights into the current state of the degree
of decentralization in representative DPoS and PoW blockchains. We believe
that the methodologies and findings in this paper can facilitate future studies
on decentralization in other blockchains and consensus protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We introduce the background
in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the preliminary measurements for Bitcoin
miners and for Steem witnesses. Then, in Section 4, we present the methodolo-
gies of measuring the impact of stakeholders in the process of stake-weighted
witness election in Steem. In Section 5, we quantify and compare the degree
of decentralization among Bitcoin miners, among Steem witnesses and among
Steem stakeholders. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 6 and we conclude
in Section 7.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the background about the Steem-blockchain [2],
including its key application Steemit, its implementation of the DPoS consensus
protocol and its ecosystem in general.
The Steem-blockchain is the backend for Steemit, which is the first blockchain-
powered social media platform that incentivizes both creator of user-generated
content and content curators. Steemit has kept its leading position during the
last few years and its native cryptocurrency, STEEM, has the highest market
capitalization among all cryptocurrencies issued by blockchain-based social net-
working projects. Users of Steemit can create and share contents as blog posts.
A blog post can get replied, reposted or voted by other users. Based on the
weights of received votes, posts get ranked and the top ranked posts make them
to the front page. Steemit uses the Steem-blockchain to store the underlying
data of the platform as a chain of blocks. Every three seconds, a new block is
produced, which includes all confirmed operations performed by users during the
last three seconds. Steemit allows its users to perform more than thirty different
types of operations. In Fig. 1, we display four categories of operations that are
most relevant to the analysis presented in this paper. While post/vote and fol-
Fig. 1: Steem blockchain overview
lower/following are common features offered by social sites, operations such as
witness election and cryptocurrency transfer are features specific to blockchains.
Witnesses in Steemit are producers of blocks, who continuously collect data
from the entire network, bundle data into blocks and append the blocks to the
Steem-blockchain. The role of witnesses in Steemit is similar to that of min-
ers in Bitcoin. In Bitcoin, miners keep solving Proof-of-Work (PoW) problems
and winners have the right to produce blocks. With PoW, Bitcoin achieves a
maximum throughput of 7 transactions/sec [3]. However, transaction rates of
typical mainstream social sites are substantially higher. For example, Twitter
has an average throughput of more than 5000 tweets/sec [10]. Hence, the Steem
blockchain adopts the Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [13] consensus protocol
to increase the speed and scalability of the platform without compromising the
decentralized reward system of the blockchain. In DPoS systems, users vote to
elect a number of witnesses as their delegates. In Steemit, each user can vote
for at most 30 witnesses. The top-20 elected witnesses and a seat randomly as-
signed out of the top-20 witnesses produce the blocks. With DPoS, consensus
only needs to be reached among the 21-member witness group, rather than the
entire blockchain network like Bitcoin, which significantly improves the system
throughput.
We now present the process of stake-weighted witness election with more
details. Any user in Steemit can run a server, install the Steem-blockchain and
synchronize the blockchain data to the latest block. Then, by sending a wit-
ness update operation to the network, the user can become a witness and have a
chance to operate the website and earn producer rewards if he or she can gather
enough support from the electors to join the 21-member witness group. A user
has two ways to vote for witnesses. The first option is to perform witness vote
operations to directly vote for at most 30 witnesses. The second option is to
perform a witness proxy operation to set another user as an election proxy. The
weight of a vote is the sum of the voter’s own stake and the stake owned by
other users who have set the voter as proxy. For example, Alice may set Bob to
be her proxy. Then, if both Alice and Bob own $100 worth of stake, any vote
cast by Bob will be associated with a weight of $200 worth of stake. Once Alice
deletes the proxy, the weight of Bob’s votes will reduce to $100 worth of stake
immediately.
The ecosystem in Steem is a bit complex. Like most blockchains, the Steem-
blockchain issues its native cryptocurrencies called STEEM and Steem Dollars
(SBD). To own stake in Steemit, a user needs to ‘lock’ STEEM /SBD in Steemit
to receive Steem Power (SP) at the rate of 1 STEEM = 1 SP and each SP is
assigned about 2000 vested shares (VESTS ) of Steemit. A user may withdraw
invested STEEM /SBD at any time, but the claimed fund will be automatically
split into thirteen equal portions to be withdrawn in the next thirteen subsequent
weeks. For example, in day 1, Alice may invest 13 STEEM to Steemit that makes
her vote obtain a weight of 13 SP (about 26000 VESTS ). Later, in day 8, Alice
may decide to withdraw her 13 invested STEEM. Here, instead of seeing her 13
STEEM in wallet immediately, her STEEM balance will increase by 1 STEEM
each week from day 8 and during that period, her SP will decrease by 1 SP
every week. In the rest of this paper, for ease of exposition and comparison, we
transfer all values of STEEM/SBD/SP/VESTS to VESTS, namely the stake in
Steem, based on 1 SBD ≈ 0.4 STEEM = 0.4 SP ≈ 800 V ESTS [9].
3 Data collection and preliminary measurements
In this section, we describe our data collection methodology and present some
preliminary measurements among Bitcoin miners and among Steem witnesses.
3.1 Data collection
The Steem-blockchain offers an Interactive Application Programming Interface
(API) for developers and researchers to collect and parse the blockchain data [8].
From block 24,671,073 to block 25,563,499, we collected 892,426 Steem blocks
produced during a time period of one month. The Bitcoin blockchain offers
similar API at [7]. From block 534,762 to block 539,261, we collected 4,499
Bitcoin blocks produced during the same one-month time period.
3.2 Preliminary measurements
To understand the degree of decentralization in Bitcoin and Steem, we start
measurements by parsing the collected blocks and counting the number of blocks
produced by each generator, namely each Bitcoin miner or Steem witness. The
results of distributions of blocks created by top-30 generators in Bitcoin and
Steem are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively.
Fig. 2: Distribution of blocks generated by top-30 miners in Bitcoin
Fig. 3: Distribution of blocks generated by top-30 witnesses in Steem
We notice that 4,430 out of 4,499 Bitcoin blocks (98.6%) were generated by
mining pools, which illustrates the domination of mining pools in current Bitcoin
mining competitions. The top 5 mining pools mined 848 (18.9%), 661 (14.7%),
571 (12.7%), 525 (11.7%) and 494 (11.0%) blocks, respectively. As revealed by
the pie chart plotted in Fig. 2, the sum of blocks produced by the top 4 mining
pools, namely 2605 (57.9%) blocks in total, has already exceeded the bar of
launching 51% attack. The top 2 mining pools generated 1,509 (33.5%) blocks
have been higher than the 33% bar suggested by the selfish mining research [5].
Intuitively, we see how fragile the security in the current Bitcoin blockchain is
in practice. It is true that mining pools may not want to attack Bitcoin as it
would decrease the market price of Bitcoin and damage the profit of themselves.
However, the risk is still high because compromising two mining pools is much
easier than attacking a large distributed network and it is also hard to quantify
and compare the short-term profit of performing double-spend before Bitcoin
gets crashed and the long-term profit of keeping honest.
Next, we notice that 844,390 out of 892,426 Steem blocks (94.6%) were gener-
ated by the top-20 witnesses. Interestingly, as indicated by the pie chart plotted
in Fig. 3, the mean and standard deviation of blocks generated by top 20 wit-
nesses are 42,219 and 978 respectively, indicating that these top 20 witnesses
continuously reserved 20 seats in the 21-member witness group and generated
nearly the same amount of blocks in the selected month. Although we do not
see that the seats were frequently switched among a larger set of witnesses, in-
tuitively, the distribution of blocks among Steem witnesses shows a trend of a
higher degree of decentralization. However, unlike mining pools in Bitcoin that
possess computational power directly determining the number of blocks they
could mine, witnesses in Steem do not own the similar resources themselves be-
cause their sears in the 21-member witness group are determined by the VESTS
(i.e., stake) accumulated from the votes cast by stakeholders in the entire net-
work. That is, block generation in Steem and other DPoS blockchains is actually
controlled by stakeholders who possess the power of appointing and removing
witnesses at any time. Therefore, in the next section, we investigate the impact
of stakeholders in the process of stake-weighted witness election in Steem, which
would facilitate the quantification of the actual level of decentralization in Steem.
4 Measurements on impact of stakeholders in Steem
In this section, we measure the actual impact of stakeholders in determining
active witnesses in Steem, namely in actually controlling the Steem blockchain.
We first present our measuring methodology and then the results.
4.1 Methodology
Each stakeholder could cast at most 30 votes and each vote is weighted by net
VESTS, namely the sum of the stakeholder’s pure VESTS and the VESTS re-
ceived from other stakeholders who have set this stakeholder as proxy. Therefore,
we first investigate pure VESTS that each stakeholder possesses and compute
net VESTS belonged to each stakeholder in witness election by combining pure
VESTS with VESTS received from other stakeholders.
However, computing the degree of decentralization in Steem based on net
VESTS is inaccurate for two reasons: (1) stakeholders may not choose to vote
for any witness and therefore, VESTS owned by this type of stakeholders has no
contribution to witness election and these stakeholders have no actual control of
the blockchain; (2) a stakeholder can cast at most 30 votes, but not all stake-
holders cast 30 votes in full. For example, Alice may cast 20 votes to 20 witnesses
and Bob may cast a single vote to a single witness. Assuming that Alice and
Bob have the same net VESTS and all these voted witnesses generated the same
amount of blocks, we consider that the impact of Alice in witness election is
twenty times that of Bob. In other words, what determines the actual impact
of a stakeholder in witness election is the accumulated VESTS from all his/her
votes, namely the multiplication of net VESTS and the number of votes.
To do that, we need to collect the number of votes cast by each stakeholder.
After that, we compute accumulated VESTS from votes cast by each stake-
holder and accumulated VESTS from votes received by each witness. Finally,
Fig. 4: Distribution of pure VESTS among stakeholders with at least 1 VESTS
Fig. 5: Distribution of net VESTS among top-30 stakeholders
we re-allocate the 892,426 Steem blocks to the stakeholders based on accumu-
lated VESTS of their votes and we investigate the distribution of blocks among
stakeholders after the re-allocation.
4.2 Measurement results
Following the above-mentioned methodology, the measurements start by investi-
gating pure VESTS that each stakeholder has in Steem at the moment of block
25,563,499. Fig. 4 shows pure VESTS of 1,077,405 stakeholders who have at
least 1 VESTS. Here, stakeholders are sorted based on their pure VESTS. The
results indicate a heavy-tailed distribution. We find that the top-10 stakehold-
ers possess 1.93E+11 VESTS, about 48.5% of overall VESTS. In contrast, the
last 1,000,000 stakeholders possess only 4.83E+09 VESTS, about 1.2% of over-
all VESTS. The top-1, top-2 and top-5 stakeholders possess 9.00E+10 (22.7%),
1.26E+11 (37.5%) and 1.74E+11 (43.9%) VESTS, respectively. Therefore, the
results here suggest a trend towards centralization in Steem, which is similar to
that in Bitcoin.
Next, Fig. 5 presents the distribution of net VESTS among top-30 stake-
holders who cast at least one vote and also set no proxy at the moment of block
Fig. 6: No. of votes casted by top-30 stakeholders
25,563,499. Stakeholders here are ranked based on their net VESTS, namely
the sum of pure VESTS and received VESTS. In the rest of this paper, for
the ease of presentation, we use the same rank for stakeholders and the phrase
’top-30 stakeholders’ refers to the top-30 stakeholders sorted by net VESTS.
The net VESTS belonging to top-1, top-3 and top-5 stakeholders are 1.58E+10,
3.23E+10 and 3.87E+10 respectively, which are only 17.6%, 21.7% and 22.2% of
the pure VESTS possessed by stakeholders with the same ranks. The main reason
is that many stakeholders neither cast a single vote nor set other stakeholders
as their proxy. Another interesting observation is that only seven stakeholder
possessing top-30 pure VESTS also own top-30 net VESTS. One possible reason
is that many stakeholders may want to isolate operations about witness election
from other types of operations, so they create a new account to be their proxy
for voting witnesses.
After measuring both pure VESTS and net VESTS, we plot the number of
votes cast by top-30 stakeholders ranked by net VESTS in Fig. 6. The results
show that only 12 out of top-30 stakeholders have cast 30 votes in full. The
number of votes is quite a personal option. The Steem team encourages the
community to actively participate in witness election, but some stakeholders
may have a strict standard in mind and believe in only less than 30 witnesses, so
they do not aim at maximizing their impact in witness election by casting exact
30 votes.
We can now compute accumulated VESTS from votes cast by top-30 stake-
holders by multiplying net VESTS and the number of cast votes. The results are
shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, the 12 stakeholders who cast 30 votes in full
amplify their net VESTS by a factor of 30 and maximize their impact in witness
election. In contrast, some stakeholders (i.e, rank-2, rank-4 and rank-7), who
cast a few votes, amplify their net VESTS by a much smaller factor, which actu-
ally reduces their impact in witness election. It is hard to comment whether the
strategy of always casting 30 votes in full is healthy for Steem or not, but stake-
holders who intend to maximize their control in the Steem blockchain would
be incentivized to always follow this strategy and their impact in Steem may
Fig. 7: Accumulated VESTS from votes cast by top-30 stakeholder
Fig. 8: Accumulated VESTS from votes received by top-30 witness
eventually overtake the impact of stakeholders who cast a personalized number
of votes.
Following the same methodology, we can also compute accumulated VESTS
from votes received by each witness, namely the sum of net VESTS of each vote
received by a witness. The results are shown in Fig. 8. The mean and standard
deviation of accumulated VESTS received by top-30 witnesses are 5.65E+10 and
1.06E+10, respectively. The comparison between Fig. 8 and Fig. 7 thus tells us
that the degree of decentralization among VESTS accumulated via witnesses
tends to be much higher than that among VESTS accumulated via stakehold-
ers. The relationship between stakeholders and witnesses is similar to that be-
tween shareholders and managers in a corporation. A corporation is actually
controlled by its shareholders, especially the major ones, and likewise the Steem
blockchain is actually controlled by shareholders, especially the ones possessing
large amounts of net VESTS. Therefore, we consider that the actual degree of
decentralization in Steem is expressed through that among stakeholders, rather
than that among witnesses. Another interesting observation is that the amount
of blocks generated by a witness is not exactly proportional to its accumulated
VESTS. For instance, the rank-8 witness in Fig. 8 received the most VESTS
from stakeholders. This scenario may be caused by the bias that we took the
Fig. 9: Distribution of blocks re-allocated to top-30 stakeholders
pure VESTS and votes as a snapshot at block 25,563,499 while some stakehold-
ers may have changed their pure VESTS or votes during the one-month time
period.
Finally, we can observe the actual degree of decentralization in Steem by re-
allocating the 892,426 Steem blocks to the stakeholders based on accumulated
VESTS of their votes. The results are shown in Fig. 9, which is obviously more
skewed than the distribution we see in Fig. 3. From the pie chart, we can see that
the majority of the 892,426 Steem blocks have been re-allocated to only a few
major stakeholders. The amounts of blocks re-allocated to the rank-1 stakeholder
and to rank-3 stakeholder are 177,698 and 91,207 respectively, namely 30.5% and
16.1% of blocks re-allocated to top-30 stakeholders or 20.0% and 10.1% of overall
blocks.
We have measured the distribution of blocks among Bitcoin miners (Fig. 2),
among Steem witnesses (Fig. 3) and finally among Steem stakeholders (Fig. 9).
In the next section, we will quantitatively analyze the degree of decentralization
in Bitcoin and Steem.
5 Quantitative analysis of the degree of decentralization
In this section, similar to the analyses in recent works [12,18], we quantify and
compare the degree of decentralization in Bitcoin and Steem by computing the
Shannon entropy [16]. We first normalize the three distributions from Fig. 2,
Fig. 3 and Fig. 9 to display a more intuitive comparison among the three dis-
tributions. We then quantify the Shannon entropy (or entropy for short) of the
three distributions.
5.1 Normalized comparison
We display the three normalized distributions at Fig. 10. Specifically, the nor-
malized number of blocks at y-axis has the range [0,1], where the upper bound
Fig. 10: Comparison of normalized distributions
indicates the number of blocks generated by the rank-1 Bitcoin miner in the Bit-
coin (miner) distribution at Fig. 2, the amount of blocks generated by the rank-1
Steem witness in the Steem (witness) distribution at Fig. 3 and the amount of
blocks re-allocated to the rank-1 Steem stakeholder in the Steem (stakeholder)
distribution at Fig. 9.
Bitcoin (miner) vs. Steem (witness): The comparison between Bitcoin min-
ers and Steem witnesses seems to support the opinion of supporters of Steem,
who believe that the design of equally generating blocks among witnesses in
DPoS blockchains is less centralized than the current PoW blockchains domi-
nated by few mining pools. It is true that the distribution of Bitcoin miners is
quite skewed while the distribution of Steem witnesses is quite flat before rank
20. It is also true that the miners/witnesses after rank 20 generate quite limited
amounts of blocks. However, the fundamental problem of this opinion is that
measuring witnesses is not the proper approach for understanding the actual
degree of decentralization in Steem. In Bitcoin, miners possess computational
power that determines their probability of mining blocks. In Steem, witnesses do
not possess VESTS that determines their chance to join the 21-member witness
group. As a result, collusion among the few top stakeholders can easily remove
the majority of current top witnesses out of the 21-member witness group and
control the seats in their hands. Therefore, to understand the actual situation,
we need to compare Bitcoin miners with Steem stakeholders.
Bitcoin (miner) vs. Steem (stakeholder): The comparison between Bitcoin
miners and Steem stakeholders can be analyzed in three ranges. From rank 1 to
7, we see that only three out of the top 7 stakeholders cast 30 votes in full, which
indicates a significant advantage owned by these three stakeholders in controlling
Steem blockchain. We also see that the distribution among top-7 stakeholders is
much skewed than that among top-7 Bitcoin miners. From rank 8 to 13, the figure
suggests no significant advantage between the two distributions. After rank 13,
we see that the distribution of Bitcoin miners quickly drops to zero while the
distribution of Steem stakeholders keeps a flat shape. Overall, intuitively, the
Fig. 11: Comparison of entropy
degree of decentralization in Bitcoin seems to be higher among top miners than
that among top Steem stakeholders but be lower among low ranking miners than
that among low ranking Steem stakeholders.
5.2 Quantitative analysis
We compute the Shannon entropy entropy of the three distribution via:
pi =
bi∑r
i=1 bi
entropy = −
r∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
where bi denotes the amount of blocks generated by miners/witnesses or re-
allocated to stakeholders and r denotes the range of miners/witnesses/stakeholders
that entropy is computed for. For instance, r = 10 indicates that entropy is com-
puted based on blocks belonging to top-10 miners/witnesses/stakeholders.
We show the computed values of entropy for r = 10, 20, 30 in Fig. 11. We
can see that the results well support our analysis in Section 5.1. First, the en-
tropy among witnesses in all selected ranges keeps being the highest one, which
suggests a higher degree of decentralization among witnesses because a group of
witnesses has a close probability to be the generator of a block and the uncer-
tainty of inferring the generator is quite high. Next, the entropy among Bitcoin
miners is higher than that among Steem stakeholders in ranges r = 10 and
r = 20 but turns to become lower in the range r = 30. The reason is that the
impact of the few major Steem stakeholders is more significant in the sets of top-
10 and top-20 stakeholders but is less significant when the computation counts
more low ranking stakeholders. The results thus indicate that, compared with
Bitcoin, Steem tends to be more centralized among top stakeholders but more
decentralized in general.
6 Related work
Most of related works on decentralization in blockchains have focused on Bit-
coin [1,4,5,17]. These works pointed out that Bitcoin shows a trend towards cen-
tralization because of the emergence of mining pools. In [5], authors proposed
the selfish mining, which reduces the bar of performing 51% attack to possess-
ing over 33% of computational power in Bitcoin. Later, authors in [4] analyzed
the mining competitions among mining pools in Bitcoin from the perspective
of game theory and proposed that a rational mining pool may get incentivized
to launch a block withholding attack to another mining pool. Besides Bitcoin,
recent work has analyzed the degree of decentralization in Steem [14]. The work
analyzed the process of witness election in Steem from the perspective of net-
work analysis and concluded that the Steem network was showing a relatively
low level of decentralization.
Recently, there have been a few studies on comparing the level of decentraliza-
tion between different blockchains [6,12,18]. Specifically, the work in [6] compared
the degree of decentralization between Bitcoin and Ethereum and concluded that
neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum was performing strictly better properties than the
other. The work in [18] also focused on investigating Bitcoin and Ethereum, but
by quantifying the degree of decentralization with Shannon entropy. Their re-
sults indicate that Bitcoin tends to be more decentralized than Ethereum. The
closest work to our study in this paper is the study in [12], where authors an-
alyzed the degree of decentralization in dozens of blockchains including Bitcoin
and Steem. However, the degree of decentralization in Steem in [12] was com-
puted among witnesses rather than stakeholders, which in our opinion fails to
reflect the actual degree of decentralization in a DPoS blockchain. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first research work that quantifies the degree
of decentralization in a DPoS blockchain from the perspective of stakeholders
after careful analysis and measurements of the witness election.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a comparison study of the degree of decentralization
in PoW-powered Bitcoin blockchain and DPoS-powered Steem blockchain. Our
study analyzes the process of stake-weighted election of witnesses in the DPoS
consensus protocol and measures the actual stake invested by each stakeholder in
Steem. We then quantify and compare the actual degree of decentralization in the
two blockchains by computing the Shannon entropy. Our measurements indicate
that, compared with Steem, Bitcoin tends to be more decentralized among top
miners but less decentralized in general. We believe that the methodologies and
findings in this paper can facilitates future studies on decentralization in other
blockchains and consensus protocols.
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